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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.
JULY, 1876.
EXTRADITION.
THE policy of returning for trial and punishment the criminal of
one country who has escaped to another, is not less manifest
than its justice. It would seem, therefore, that there ought to be no
great difficulty in agreeing upon the proper international regulations
for the purpose. This, however, has until recently been practically
an impossibility. While the leading nations of Christendom were
engaged for a very large proportion of the time in inflicting upon
each other all the mischief possible, it was not to be expected that
they would be solicitous to assist in the enforcement of their respect-
ive criminal laws. Indeed the opposite course was to be looked for;
that they would harbor fugitives for the mischief they had done or
might do to other nations rather than return them for punishment.
Moreover a sentiment has prevailed that something of national
dignity and importance was involved in the state furnishing a secure
refuge and asylum to the fugitives from other lands, and in its resist-
ing any thing which might seem like an extension of the authority
of a foreign power to seize and punish persons beyond its borders.
If the subject is dispassionately considered, the conclusion is of
course inevitable, that any nation is interested in not becoming,
actively or passively, the protector for the criminals of other nations.
The recognition of this fact will always be sufficiently prompt and
decided when any nation is found to be getting rid of its criminals
by banishing them to the dominions of its neighbors; and persistence
in a course of that description would be quite certain to lead to inter-
national difficulties. One would suppose, therefore, that the country
which was made one of refuge for offenders would be the one most
solicitous to form engagements for their return and punishment,
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EXT R A D I T ION. 
T HE poli~ of returning for trial and punishment the criminal of 
one country who has escaped to another, is not less manifest 
than its justice. It would seem, therefore, that there ought to be no 
great difficulty in agreeing upon the proper international regulations 
for the purpose. This, ho:wever, has until recently been practically 
an impossibility. \Vhile the leading nations of Christendom were 
engaged for a very large proportion of the time in inflicting upon 
each other all the mischief possible, it was not to be expected that 
they would be solicitous to assist in the enforcement of their respect-
ive criminal laws. Indeed the opposite course was to be looked for; 
that they would harbor fugitives for the mischief they had done or 
might do to other nations rather than return them for punishment. 
Moreover a sentiment has prevailed that something of national 
dignity and importance was involved in the state furnishing a secure 
refuge and asylum to the fugitives from other lands, and in its resist-
ing any thing which might seem like an extension of the authority 
of a foreign power to seize and punish persons beyond its borders. 
If the subject is dispassionately considered, the conclusion is of 
course inevitable, that any nation is interested in not becoming, 
actively or passively, the protector for the criminals of other nations. 
The recognition of this fact will always be sufficiently prompt and 
decided when any nation is found to be getting rid of its criminals 
by banishing them to the dominions of its neighbors; and persistencp. 
in a course of that description would be quite certain to lead to inter-
national difficulties. One would suppose, therefore, that the country 
which was made one of refuge for offenders would be the one most 
solicitous to form engagements for their return and punishment, 
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especially if this should appear to be the most feasible method of
getting rid of them. Undoubtedly any country might provide by
municipal law for sending beyond its limits any alien found within
them who had been guilty of crime abroad; but an attempt to
determine the criminality would involve difficult, expensive and often
futile inquiries into the facts transpiring in other countries, and there
would be likelihood of the banishment being regarded as an un-
friendly act by the country into which, without its request, the
criminal should be driven. Some previous international arrangement
is therefore essential, and the proper arrangement is obviously one
under which the accused person may be returned, for the purposes of
a trial, on the demand of the sovereignty whose law has been violated.
The difficulties attending proper treaties for extradition are to be
found first, in agreeing upon the proper cases for their application,
and second, in determining the principles and machinery for their
enforcement. Where federal government exists there may be some
peculiar difficulties also.
I. As regards the cases to which such treaties should apply, refer-
ence may be made to the internal regulations of this country. The
United States, by their Constitution, undertook to cover all cases by
a general provision that " A person charged in any state with treason,
felony, or other crime" who should flee from justice to another state,
should be delivered up; but this very comprehensive provision could
never have been intended for literal enforcement, and certainly never
had such enforcement. It is true that the Federal Supreme Court
declared in one case that all acts made criminal by state law were
within the contemplation of this provision, but the states never fully
recognized the doctrine, and in some noted instances refused to act
upon it. The Constitution provided no means for its enforcement
against unwilling State officials, and the latter declined to respond to
a demand for the surrender of a fugitive if in their opinion the act of
which he was accused ought not to be made criminal.
The treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great Britain,
was more specific in pointing out the cases in which fugitives should
be returned. The cases specified were those of " persons charged
with murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper."
Later treaties with other countries have enlarged this list very
greatly; that of 1868 with Italy embracing murder, and the attempt
to commit murder, rape, arson, piracy, mutiny on shipboard, burglary,
robbery, forgery, counterfeiting and the uttering of forged or coun-
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especially if this should appear to be the most feasible method of 
getting rid of them. Undoubtedly any country might provide by 
municipal law for sending beyond its limits any alien found within 
them who had been guilty of crime abroad; but an attempt to 
determine the criminality would involve difficult, expensive and often 
futile inquiries into the facts transpiring in other countries, and there 
would be likelihood of the banishment being regarded as an un-
friendly act by the country into which, without its request, the 
criminal should be driven. Some previous international arrangement 
is therefore essential, and the proper arrangement is obviously one 
under which the accused person may be returned, for the purposes of 
a trial, on the demand of the sovereignty whose law has been violated. 
The difficulties attending proper treaties for extradition are to be 
found first, in agreeing upon the proper cases for their application, 
and second, in determining the principles and machinery for their 
enforcement. Where federal government exists there may be some 
peculiar difficulties also. 
I. As regards the cases to which such treaties should apply, refer-
ence may be made to the internal regulations of this country. The 
United States, by their Constitution, undertook to cover all cases by 
a general provision that" A person charged in any state with treason, 
felony, or otlur crime," who should flee from justice to another state, 
should be delivered up; but this very comprehensive provision could 
never have been intended for literal enforcement, and certainly never 
had such enforcement. It is true that the Federal Supreme Court 
declared in one case that all acts made criminal by state law were 
within the contemplation of this provision, but the states never fully 
recognized the doctrine, and in some noted instances refused to act 
upon it. The Constitution provided no means for its enforcement 
against unwilling State officials, and the latter declined to respond to 
a demand for the surrender of a fugitive if in their opinion the act of 
which he was accused ought not to be made criminal. 
The treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great Britain, 
was more specific in pointing out the cases in which fugitives should 
be returned. The cases specified were those of "persons charged 
with murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or 
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper." 
Later treaties with other countries have enlarged this list very 
greatly; that of 1868 with Italy embracing murder, and the attempt 
to commit murder, rape, arson, piracy, mutiny on shipboard, burglary, 
robbery, forgery, counterfeiting and the uttering of forged or coun-
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terfeit coin, paper, etc., embezzlement by public officers and by
clerks, etc. It will be perceived that even the latter list fails to
embrace many offenses that would be punished by the contracting
powers respectively, and it is reasonable to conclude that such offenses
are excluded because not regarded as proper subjects of treaty regu-
lations. That many of them should be excluded will be apparent
when they are mentioned.
1. The offenses which Blackstone not very felicitously styles
"offenses against God and religion," must be excluded from extradi-
tion treaties for the very obvious reason that no two countries agree
exactly as to the acts which constitute offenses of this class. Indeed
even among Christian nations some things are looked upon as a duty
by one which another regards as such an offense to the Deity as
human laws ought to punish; and it is only necessary to suppose the
case of a treaty of extradition between Germany and France, or Great
Britain and Spain, and it is perceived at once that an attempt to aid
each other in the enforcement of their respective laws on these sub-
jects would only originate difficulties instead of obviating them, and
lead to national quarrels in the attempt to punish individual offenders.
2. A similar difficulty, though less serious in its probable results,
would be encountered in the case of offenses against the marriage
laws. In these cases, also, there is no general agreement, and as to
some of them the differences are as positive and decided as in the
case of offenses against the religious establishments or regulations of
different countries. Even in the American Union these differences
are sufficiently marked to be troublesome. A man would be punished
in one state for marrying his step-daughter, but in another he may do
so lawfully. Some states forbid the guilty party to a divorce from
marrying again; in others such prohibitions are looked upon as preju-
dicial to public morals. International regulations on the subject
would encounter still greater difficulties; for while one nation might
demand that the man who had married his deceased wife's sister
should be delivered up to punishment, another which recognized
polygamy might insist upon provisions under which the second or
the twentieth wife fleeing from the harem should be dragged back to
the justice of the bow-string.
3. No nation can reasonably be expected to assist in the punish-
ment of offenses against the revenue laws of another. Very many of
those laws are really framed in a spirit of hostility to the interests of
other nations, and this to such an extent that their evasion seems not
only justifiable but in many cases commendable. A country whose
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terfeit coin, paper, etc., embezzlement by public officers and by 
clerks, etc. It will be perceived that even the latter list fails to 
embrace many offenses that would be punished by the contracting 
powers respectively, and it is reasonable to conclude that such offenses 
are excluded because not regarded as proper subjects of treaty regu-
lations. That many of them should be excluded will be apparent 
when they are mentioned. 
I. The offenses which Blackstone not very felicitously styles 
"offenses against God and religion," must be excluded from extradi-
tion treaties for the very obvious reason that no two countries agree 
exactly as to the acts which constitute offenses of this class. Indeed 
even among Christian nations some things are looked upon as a duty 
by one which another regards as such an offense to the Deity as 
human laws ought to punish; and it is only necessary to suppose the 
case of a treaty of extradition between Germany and France, or Great 
Britain and Spain, and it is perceived at once that an attempt to aid 
each other in the enforcement of their respective laws on these sub-
jects would only originate difficulties instead of obviating them, and 
lead to national quarrels in the attempt to punish individual offenders. 
2. A similar difficulty, though less serious in its probable results, 
would be encountered in the case of offenses against the marriage 
laws. In these cases, also, there is no general agreement, and as to 
some of them the differences are as positive and decided as in the 
case of offenses against the religious establishments or regulations of 
different countries. Even in the American Union these differences 
are sufficiently marked to be troublesome. A man would be punished 
in one state for marrying his step-daughter, but in another he may do 
so lawfully. Some states forbid the guilty party to a divorce from 
marrying again; in others such prohibitions are looked upon as preju-
dicial to public morals. International regulations on the subject 
would encounter still greater difficulties; for while one nation might 
demand that the man who had married his deceased wife's sister 
should be delivered up to punishment, another which recognized 
polygamy might insist upon provisions under which the second or 
the twentieth wife fleeing from the harem should be dragged back to 
the justice of the bow-string. 
3. No nation can reasonably be expected to assist in the punish-
ment of offenses against the revenue laws of another. Very many of 
those laws are really framed in a spirit of hostility to the interests of 
other nations, and this to such an extent that their evasion seems not 
,only justifiable but in many cases commendable. A country \\·hose 
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industry is discriminated against by the protective duties of another
would be more likely to retaliate than to assist in their enforcement,
and the common law which was somewhat scrupulous in denouncing
contracts made in circumvention of the law, would even lend its aid
in the enforcement of those which contemplated the evasion of the
revenue laws of other countries. Cases of smuggling, therefore, and
all cases of the class must be excluded from treaties of extra-
dition.
4. Political offenses must also be excluded for reasons equally
apparent. The most serious political offenses often fail of justifica-
tion only because they are not successful, and the nation against
which they are committed is justified in punishing them not because
they are morally wrong, but because the existence and stability of
the government seem to depend upon it. The sympathies of the
world must be expected to go with the leader of an unsuccessful
revolution, provided he seems to have been influenced in his action
by patriotic motives, and to have had a reasonable prospect of better-
ing his country by his success. And manifestly a republic could not
assist in the punishment of a revolt against despotism, nor a believer
in the divine right of kings be expected to aid in punishing those
who had unsuccessfully attempted the overthrow of a democracy.
5. Without further attempt at specific classification, it may be said
generally that all offenses must be excepted that are not by the com-
mon consent of civilized nations denounced as malum in se. If with
one nation an act is malum prohibitum only; if it is denounced on
grounds of policy peculiar to that nation, or of morality and justice
that other nations do not recognize, it is plain that it can not be
covered by a treaty of extradition. Certain nations may make their
engagements more comprehensive than others, because they agree
more perfectly in their views and sentiments; but the statement
above made is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes.
II. In providing machinery for the enforcement of an extradition
treaty, the following particulars would seem to be requisite:
1. A provision for prompt arrest on mere accusation. This will
sometimes work injustice, but without it a treaty would be too easily
evaded to be of much value.
2. Without unnecessary delay there should be required in the
country of the offense a judicial investigation that should determine
whether a case existed which was within the treaty, and if so, should
be the basis of the demand for surrender.
3. In the country of arrest there should also be a judicial inquiry,
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industry is discriminated against by the protective duties of another 
would be more likely to retaliate than to assist in their enforcement, 
and the common law which was somewhat scrupulous in denouncing 
contracts made in circumvention of the law, would even lend its aid 
in the enforcement of those which contemplated the evasion of the 
revenue laws of other countries. Cases of smuggling, therefore, and 
all cases of the class must be excluded from treaties of extra-' 
clition. 
4. Political offenses must also be excluded for reasons equally 
apparent. The most serious political offenses often fail of justifica-
tion only because they are not successful, and the nation against 
which they are committed is justified in punishing them not because 
they are morally wrong, but because the existence and stability of 
the government seem to depend upon it. The sympathies of the 
world must be expected to go with the leader of an unsuccessful 
rc,"olution, provided he seems to have been influenced in his action 
by patriotic motives, and to have had a reasonable prospect of better-
ing his country by his success. And manifestly a republic could not 
assist in the punishment of a revolt against despotism, nor a believer 
in the divine right of kings be expected to aid in punishing those 
who had unsuccessfully attempted the overthrow of a democracy. 
5. Without further attempt at specific classification, it may be said 
generally that all offenses must be excepted that are not by the com-
mon consent of civilized nations denounced as malum in se. If with 
one nation an act is malum prohibitum only; if it is denounced on 
grounds of policy peculiar to that nation, or of morality and justice 
tbat other nations do not recognize, it is plain that it can not be 
covered by a treaty of extradition. Certain nations may make their 
engagements more comprehensive than others, because they agree 
more perfectly in their views and sentiments; but the statement 
above made is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes. 
II. In providing machinery for the enforcement of an extradition 
treaty, the following particulars would seem to be requisite: 
I. A provision for prompt arrest on mere accusation. This will 
sometimes work injustice, but without it a treaty would be too easily 
evaded to be of much value. 
2. Without unnecessary delay there should be required in the 
country of the offense a judicial investigation that should determine 
whether a case existed which was within the treaty, and if so, should 
be the basis of the demand for surrender. 
3. In the country of arrest there should also be a judicial inquiry, 
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as a basis for executive action in determining upon the propriety of
responding favorably to the demand.
4. Report of this inquiry should be made to the executive, and if
satisfactory, be followed by his warrant of extradition.
But careful provision for such proceedings can not preclude all
difficulty. It requires wise, cautious, dispassionate and just action to
prevent such controversies and collisions as that which recently
sprung up between the United States and Great Britain. Such
treaties are peculiarly susceptible of being perverted to purposes
never contemplated in making them. This may be made evident by
a few illustrations. The treaty of 1842, already alluded to, was silent
on the subject of political offenses, the intent being not to embrace
them. A participant in the late rebellion in this country, if he had
fled to Great Britain could therefore not have been demanded under
the treaty for his treason. Suppose, however, that our authorities,
instead of charging him with treason, had proceeded against him for
some other offense—say for murder in the killing of some Union
soldier. Here the charge would have been within the terms of the
treaty, and possibly the facts as detailed by witnesses and set forth
in the papers might have made out a case which was prima facie one
of criminal homicide properly designated murder. But here it would
be the manifest duty of the British Government to look beyond the
prima facie showing, and deal with the case as being what it was in
fact, one of a political nature. A case which actually occurred in
1860 is instructive. In that year a slave in Missouri, in order to effect
his escape, killed his master. This was murder in Missouri, but in
Canada to which Tie fled, it was looked upon as an incident only in a
justifiable struggle for liberty, and the authorities refused to recognize
it as a case within the treaty. They would equally have refused to
recognize any offense which was really an offense against the slave
code, whatever might be the form of the charge. Suppose the treaty
had provided for the case of mutiny on shipboard, would our govern-
ment have expected Great Britain to recognize a rising of slaves
against the master who was transporting them from state to state, as
a case within the treaty? Certainly, now that we have abolished
slavery, our government would applaud any similar rising instead of
assisting in dealing with it as a crime.
Some other cases may be more difficult of solution, although the
facts, when closely examined, may give reason for the belief that the
very offense charged has been committed. It is notorious that the
power to extradite offenders as between the states is most grossly
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as a basis for executive action in determining upon the propriety of 
responding favorably to the demand. 
4. Report of this inquiry should be made to the executive, and if 
satisfactory, be followed by his warrant of extradition. 
But careful provision for such proceedings can not preclude all 
difficulty. It requires wise, cautious, dispassionate and just action to 
prevent such controversies and collisions as that which recently 
sprung up between the United States and Great Britain. Such 
treaties are peculiarly susceptible of being perverted to purposes 
never contemplated in making them. This may be made evident by 
a few illustrations. The treaty of 1842, already alluded to, was silent 
on the subject of political offenses, the intent being not to embrace 
them. A participant in the late rebellion in this country, if he had 
fled to Great Britain could therefore not have been demanded under 
the treaty for his treason. Suppose, however, that our authorities, 
instead of charging him with treason, had proceeded against him for 
some other offense-say for murder in the killing of some Union 
soldier. Here the charge would have been within the terms of the 
treaty, and possibly the facts as detailed by witnesses and set forth· 
in the papers might have made out a case which was prima facie one 
of criminal homicide properly designated murder. But here it would 
be the manifest duty of the British Government to look beyond the 
prima facie showing, and deal with the case as being what it was in 
fact, one of a political nature. A case which actually occurred in 
1860 is instructive. In that year a slave in Missouri, in order to effect 
his escape, killed his master. This was murder in Missouri, but in 
Canada to which he fled, it was looked upon as an incident only in a 
justifiable struggle for liberty, and the authorities refused to recognize 
it as a case within the treaty. They would equally have refused to 
recognize any offense which was really an offense against the slave 
code, whatever might be the form of the charge. Suppose the treaty 
had provided for the case of mutiny on shipboard, would our govern-
ment have expected Great Britain to recognize a rising of slaves 
against the master who was transporting them from state to state, as 
a case within the treaty? Certainly, now that we have abolished 
slavery, our government would applaud any similar rising instead of 
assisting in dealing with it as a crime. 
Some other cases may be more difficult of solution, although the 
facts, when closely examined, may give reason for the belief that the 
very offense charged has been committed. It is notorious that th~ 
power to extradite offenders as between the states is most grossly 
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abused, particularly in those cases in which the charge is of obtaining
property by false pretenses. It is not a large estimate that in a
majority of cases what is sought is not public justice but the collec-
tion of a private debt. In some instances state governors, in
issuing their requisitions for the return of alleged fugitives, have
expressly made it a condition that the complainant should protect
the state against all expense; and Gen. Dix, when Governor of New
York, very properly refused to honor such a requisition because pre-
sumptively it was issued for a private and not for a public purpose.
Other accusations are made which the parties have no expectation of
substantiating, in order to bring persons in one state within the reach
of the civil process of another. Abuses of this nature require to be
carefully guarded against, and they may occur under extradition
treaties as well as under the internal regulations of our own country.
In these cases there may or may not be such an offense^as is charged;
the point is, that the process is not sued out to punish crime but to
collect a debt.
Protection against any such abuses must be found either first, in
the caution and vigilance of the judicial and executive authorities,
when making their inquiry into the facts before the surrender is
assented to, or second, in a recognition of the principle that the ex-
tradited party shall not be subject to prosecution on any other charge
than that to which he has been surrendered. If the vigilance of the
authorities is to be relied upon as security, it can not well go beyond
a careful inquiry into the facts in order to determine whether the
charge is made in good faith and on grounds apparently sufficient;
but if the demand is refused when the case is prima facie sufficient,
the impugnment of good faith would be very likely to lead to diffi-
culty. A much more suitable and satisfactory security would be
found in the recognition of a principle that would preclude the parties
active in procuring a surrender from making use of the process for
purposes which they have not avowed.
The following provision in a treaty of extradition would be
perfectly reasonable: That a person delivered up as a fugitive
from justice should not be subject to trial or punishment in the
country receiving him, on any other than the charge specified in
the warrant of extradition, until that charge had been finally
disposed of, nor afterwards until he had had reasonable oppor-
tunity to return to the country extraditing him. The principle of
the following should also be assented to, though some exceptions
should probably be made: That he should for a like period be
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abused, particularly in those cases in which the charge is of obtaining 
property by false pretenses. I t is not a large estimate that in a 
majority of cases what is sought is not public justice but the collec-
tion of a private debt. In some instances state governors, in 
issuing their requisitions for the return of alleged fugitives, have 
expressly made it a condition that the complainant should protect 
the state against all expense; and Gen. Dix, when Governor of New 
York, very properly refused to honor such a requisition because pre-
sumptively it was issued for a private and not for a public purpose. 
Other accusations are made which the parties have no expectation of 
substantiating, in order to bring persons in one state within the reach 
of the civil process of another. Abuses of this nature require to be 
carefully guarded against, and they may occur under extradition 
treaties as well as under the internal regulations of our own country. 
In these cases there mayor may not be such an offense.as is charged; 
the point is, that the process is not sued out to punish crime but to 
collect a debt. 
Protection against any such abuses must be found either .first, in 
the caution and vigilance of the judicial and executive authorities, 
when making their inquiry into the facts before the surrender is 
assented to, Qr second, in a recognition of the principle that the ex-
tradited party shall not be subject to prosecution on any other charge 
than that to which he has been surrendered. If the vigilance of the 
authorities is to be relied upon as security, it can not well go beyond 
a careful inquiry into the facts in order to determine whether the 
charge is made in good faith and on grounds apparently sufficient; 
but if the demand is refused when the case is prima facie sufficient, 
the impugnment of good faith would be very likely to lead to diffi-
culty. A much more suitable and satisfactory security would be 
found in the recognition of a principle that would preclude the parties 
active in procuring a surrender from making use of the process for 
purposes which they have not avowed. 
The following provision in a treaty of extradition would be 
perfectly reasonable: That a person delivered up as a fugitive 
from justice should not be subject to trial or punishment in the 
country receiving him, on any other than the charge specified in 
the warrant of extradition, until that charge had been finally 
disposed of, nor afterwards until he had had reasonable oppor-
tunity to return to the country extraditing him. The: principle of 
the following should also be assented to, though some exceptions 
should probably be made: That he should for a like period be 
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exempt from civil process in the country to which he had been
forcibly returned.
There are cases in which the courts have recognized the princi-
ple that when a person is brought within the reach of judicial process
for one purpose, advantage can not be taken of his enforced presence
to serve him with process for another purpose. It is this principle
that protects parties attending as witnesses from being arrested on
the processes of local courts; and it is so perfectly reasonable that it
might well have been applied by analogy to the case of a party
extradited for one offense and then charged with another. But it
has not been so applied, and there were certain English precedents
in criminal cases that would have stood in the way. To give the
needed protection would consequently require one of two things:
1. An executive pledge, given on receiving the surrender of an accused
person, that he should be held only on the charge to which he was
surrendered; or 2. A treaty stipulation to that effect. Where federal
government exists an executive pledge would not alone be sufficient,
because it could not be enforced. In the United States, for example,
the several States and their judiciary are bound by all the stipulations
of the Federal Constitution, and by the laws and treaties made in
pursuance thereof; but the pledge of the federal executive is neither
constitution, law nor treaty, and therefore can not bind them.
The exemption of an extradited person from civil process ought
to be complete except in one contingency. If private wrongs which
would be the foundation of a suit at law, were connected with the
public wrong, and sprung from the same facts, and the offender is
found guilty of the crime, it is no injustice, nor can there be abuse of
the proceeding, in holding him then subject to civil process for such
wrongs. But if the public prosecution is abandoned, or breaks down
on trial, there would be palpable wrong and almost certain abuse if
private parties might then take advantage of the proceedings for
their own purposes. Suppose, for example, a party is seized in Great
Britain and brought to America on a charge of robbery; if the charge
proves well founded, there is no good reason why the prosecutor
should not in a private suit recover the chattel or its value; but if
the public authorities ascertain that it is really no robbery, but only
a taking of property on a bona fide claim of title, and on this ground
abandon the proceedings, it would be a gross wrong to permit the
prosecutor to obtain a private remedy by thus subjecting his adver-
sary to great trouble and expense on an unfounded charge.
AH our existing extradition treaties are defective in the particular
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exempt from civil process in the country to which he had been 
forcibly returned. 
There are cases in which the courts have recognized the princi-
ple that when a person is brought within the reach of judicial process 
for one purpose, advantage can not be taken of his enforced presence 
to serve him with process for another purpose. It is this principle 
that protects parties attending as witnesses from being an"ested on 
the processes of local courts: and it is so perfectly reasonable that it 
might well have been applied by analogy to the case of a party 
extradited for one offense and then charged with another. But it 
has not been so applied, and there were certain English precedents 
in criminal cases that would have stood in the way. To give the 
needed protection would consequently require one of two things: 
I. An executive pledge, given on receiving the surrender of an accused 
person, that he should be held only on the charge to which he was 
surrendered; or 2. A treaty stipulation to that effect. \Vhere federal 
government exists an executive pledge would not alone be sufficient, 
because it could not be enforced. In the United States, for example, 
the several States and their judiciary are bound by all the stipulations 
of the Federal Constitution, and by the laws and treaties made in 
pursuance thereof; but the pledge of the federal executive is neither 
constitution, law nor treaty, and therefore can not bind them. 
The exemption of an extradited person from civil process ought 
to be complete except in one contingency. If private wrongs which 
would be the foundation of a suit at law, were connected with the 
public wrong, and sprung from the same facts, and the offender is 
found guilty of the crime, it is no injustice, nor can there be abuse of 
the proceeding, in holding him then subject to civil process for such 
wrongs. But if the public prosecution is abandoned, or breaks down 
on trial, there would be palpable wrong and almost certain abuse if 
private parties might then take advantage of the proceedings for 
their own purposes. Suppose, for example, a party is seized in Great 
Britain and brought to America on a charge of robbery; if the charge 
proves well founded, there is no good reason why the prosecutor 
should not in a private suit recover the chattel or its value; but if 
the public authorities ascertain that it is really no robbery, but only 
a taking of property on a bona fide claim of title, and on this ground 
abandon the proceedings, it would be a gross wrong to permit the 
prosecutor to obtain a private remedy by thus subjecting his adver-
sary to great trouble and expense on an unfounded charge. 
All our existing extradition treaties are defective in the particular 
0: iz b Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
440 EXTRADITION.
indicated, and difficulties will be likely to arise until they are modi-
fied. And it is greatly to be regretted that the treaty with Great
Britain could not have been modified by prompt and cordial concur-
rence, thus saving the recent unfortunate controversy.
It may be thought that provisions, such as have been suggested,
would create embarrassment and lead to the escape of criminals in
cases where their crimes were numerous. Winslow, for example, is
supposed to have committed several offenses of the same nature,
though his extradition was demanded for one only. But it would be
easy to provide for such cases all the distinct inquiries that are neces-
sary to cover them, and even to provide for independent inquiries
afterwards if offenses should subsequently come to light. What is
important is that the government, consenting to surrender a person
who is within its jurisdiction, should have the opportunity of satisfy-
ing itself, by means of the inquiries of its own officers, that it is not
being made the instrument of wrong and oppression, or of punishing
acts which its own people do not look upon as criminal.
At the time we write the correspondence between our govern-
ment and that of Great Britain, concerning the case of Winslow, is
not published, or indeed concluded, and it is impossible to make it
the subject of intelligent discussion. So far as we are able to judge
from all that has found its way into the public prints, the British
government would seem to have been contending for the principle
that the country which consents to extradite an accused person is
entitled to be assured that he is demanded for trial on the charge set
forth in the papers and on no other. As the principle is sound, the
government can not be blamed for endeavoring to secure it. But as
has already been stated, our own government is powerless to give the
requisite security unless a treaty provides for it, and the existing
treaty with Great Britain does not. Were Winslow to be returned,
he would pass at once into the hands of the judiciary, and cease to
be under executive control. The President, consequently, could not
if he would, prevent the accused from being compelled to respond to
ordinary process either civil or criminal. What the British govern-
ment should have done, therefore, was to ask an amendment of the
treaty, instead of making inadmissible demands under it. And it
was particularly unfortunate that Winslow's case was made the occa-
sion for controversy, since there was not the slightest reason, so far
as we are aware, for charging or suspecting bad faith in the demand
for his surrender.
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indicated, and difficulties will be likely to arise until they are modi-
fied. And it is greatly to be regretted that the treaty with Great 
Britain could not have been modified by prompt and cordial concur-
rence, thus saving the recent unfortunate controversy. 
It may be thought that provisions, such as have been suggested, 
would create embarrassment and lead to the escape of criminals in 
cases where their crimes were numerous. Winslow, for example, is 
supposed to have committed several offenses of the same nature, 
though his extradition was demanded for one only. But it would be 
easy to provide for such cases all the distinct inquiries that are neces-
sary to cover them, and even to provide for independent inquiries 
afterwards if offenses should subsequently come to light. \\That is 
important is that the government, consenting to surrender a person 
who is within its jurisdiction, should have the opportunity of satisfy-
ing itself, by means of the inquiries of its own officers, that it is not 
being made the instrument of wrong and oppression, or of punishing 
acts which its own people do not look upon as criminal. 
At the time we write the correspondence between our govern-
ment and that of Great Britain, concerning the case of Winslow, is 
not published, or indeed concluded, and it is impossible to make it 
the suJjject of intelligent discussion. So far as we are able to judge 
from all that has found its way into the public prints, the British 
government would seem to have been contending for the principle 
that the country which consents to extradite an accused person is 
entitled to be assured that he is demanded for trial ~m the charge set 
forth in the papers and on no other. As the principle is sound, the 
government can not be blamed for endeavoring to secure it. But as 
has already been stated, our own government is powerless to give the 
requisite security unless a treaty provides for it, and the existing 
treaty with Great Britain does not. Were Winslow to be returned, 
he would pass at once into the hands of the judiciary, and cease to 
be under executive control. The President, consequently, could not 
if he would, prevent the accused from being compelled to respond to 
ordinary process either civil or criminal. \Vhat the British govern-
ment should have done, therefore. was to ask an amendment of the 
treaty, instead of making inadmissible demands under it. And it 
was particularly unfortunate that Winslow's case was made the occa-
sion for controversy, since there was not the slightest reason, so far 
as we are aware, for charging or suspecting bad faith in the demand 
for his surrender. 
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